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Discourse studies within the cognitive-linguistic framework of 
Mental Space Theory and Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002) have been less successful in incorporating situational 
contexts in their analysis of interactional data. One promising 
avenue for narrowing this gap is to integrate the MST-BT program 
with the insights of Erving Goffman, especially his interactionally 
grounded notion of “frame”. This paper is an attempt to achieve this 
integration through a conceptual blending analysis of the first 
person pronoun we in teacher-student interactions in the English as 
a Second Language (ESL) context.  
 
If the sociologist Erving Goffman were alive today and called upon to 
refine the existing enterprise of Cognitive Linguistics, especially in its analysis 
of naturally occurring discourse in face-to-face interactions, how would he 
respond? There is obviously no definitive answer to this question, but there is a 
promising entry point through which we can start to examine how Goffman’s 
insights might productively interact with discourse studies in Cognitive 
Linguistics, viz. Mental Space Theory (MST) and Conceptual Blending Theory 
(BT), a powerful theoretical paradigm proposed by Fauconnier (1994, 1997) and 
Fauconnier and Turner (2000, 2001, 2002, inter alia) to account for cognitive 
processes presumably involved in online construction of meaning in ongoing 
discourse. In fact, the MST and BT framework makes explicit reference to 
Goffman’s work in its theoretical formulation of how mental spaces are 
structured by frames and other similar cognitive models. In this paper, I intend 
to explore how research in MST and BT can be enriched in a revealing way 
through their integration with some salient Goffmanian perspectives, in 
particular his notion of “frame” (Goffman, 1974; 1981). 
The venue I have chosen for this rather ambitious attempt is the English as 
a Second Language (ESL) classroom, a choice made mainly because discourse 
studies in Cognitive Linguistics have hitherto skirted discourse patterns in ESL 
and any other second language (L2) classroom interactions. The main objective 
of the paper is thus twofold: to investigate how Goffman’s notion of “frame” 
would beneficially augment the mainstream thinking of MST and BT, and to 
explore how such a revised version of the MST-BT enterprise can illuminate 
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aspects of classroom interactions in the ESL context that have been left 
relatively untouched. The analysis will focus on the use of the first person plural 
pronoun we in actual recorded interactions in an advanced ESL class at a U.S. 
university from the perspective of the Goffman-enriched MST-BT framework.  
 
Theoretical Background: Mental Spaces and Conceptual Blending 
 
Mental spaces are small conceptual packets built up provisionally as we think 
and talk for the purpose of local understanding and action (Fauconnier and 
Turner, 2002, p. 40) and they “contain partial representations of the entities and 
relationships in any given scenario as perceived, imagined, remembered, or 
otherwise understood by a speaker” (Coulson & Oakley, 2005, p. 1512). In its 
embryonic stage, Mental Space Theory focused mainly, if not exclusively, on the 
kinds of puzzling referential relationships linguistically encoded in discourse 
that elude any rational account from the perspective of logic. In one of the most 
celebrated examples, the sentence Len believes that the girl with blue eyes has 
green eyes cannot be assigned any plausible truth-conditional value if the 
exclusive principle in logic is to be taken seriously. MST, by contrast, offers an 
elegant solution to such a logical paradox by invoking two partially represented 
mental spaces, the Reality space to which Lenny’s sense of reality is anchored, 
and the Belief space opened up by the space builder “believe”, in which the 
content of his specific belief about the described girl resides. On this view, the 
girl in the Reality space is connected to the girl in the Belief space through a 
pragmatic connector of identity and the apparent contradiction about the color of 
the girl’s eyes is resolved as the description “green eyes” needs to hold only in 
the Belief space. 
In its early evolution, however, it gradually became clear that MST as it 
was originally conceived was not sufficiently equipped to handle certain well 
attested linguistic phenomena, including counterfactuals and metaphors. This 
revelation in turn gave rise to the development of a theory of conceptual 
blending or conceptual integration that builds on the basic insights of MST. In 
its most standard form, a conceptually blended structure involves four spaces: 
two input spaces from which elements are selectively projected onto a blended 
space, while whatever commonalities that hold between the two input spaces are 
contained in a generic space that somehow regulates psychologically valid 
combinations of input spaces for blending. The easiest way to illustrate how 
conceptual blending works is to demonstrate how certain metaphorical 
expressions cannot be given a straightforward explanation for their conveyed 
meanings within the standard cognitive-linguistic theory of conceptual 
metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993) which treats metaphors as 
conceptual mappings from their “source” domains to their “target” domains. A 
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case in point is the oft-quoted metaphor in the literature, This surgeon is a 
butcher. According to Grady, Oakley, and Coulson (1999), one of the most 
immediately available interpretations of the metaphor, without any further 
contextual information, is that it is a damning statement about the surgeon’s 
ineptness as a practitioner. This “emergent” meaning, the authors argue, cannot 
be captured adequately by the supposed correspondences between the source 
domain of butchery and the target domain of surgery, such as surgeon as butcher, 
scalpel as cleaver, and patient as dead meat, because the notion of 
incompetence does not arise from such mappings; butchers, after all, cannot be 
said to be “incompetent” at what they do. The solution the authors offer is that 
through selective projection from the two input spaces (the “surgery” and 
“butchery” spaces), the surgeon emerges as incompetent because the 
fundamental incongruity of the butcher’s means (i.e. butchery) with the 
surgeon’s ends (i.e. healing the patient) in the blended space leads to a central 
inference about his/her incompetence (ibid, pp. 103-106). 
Another basic assumption that undergirds both MST and BT is that 
language “does not carry meaning, it guides it” (Fauconnier, 1994, xxii) by 
providing prompts, or instructions, for constructing particular configurations of 
mental spaces and their integration. In other words, linguistic elements are 
underspecified as to the actual message they convey in specific contexts and the 
role of context is thus vital to any full-scale understanding of how online 
construction of meaning is possible in discourse. The MST-BT program, 
however, has yet to fully embrace this theoretical and empirical imperative of 
incorporating specific local contextual information into its basic scheme. This is 
exactly where Goffman comes into play, as his frame analysis has demonstrated 
how interactants’ co-constructed understanding of “what is going on” in specific 
social situations has a profound impact on the intersubjective meaning 
realization of concrete utterances (Goffman, 1974; 1981).  
 
Interactional Meaning Construction and Conceptual Blending 
 
The scope of the term frame often used in the MST and BT literature 
overlaps with what Tannen and Wallat (1987, p. 207) call “knowledge structure 
schema”, which refers to “participants’ expectations about people, objects, 
events, and settings in the world”. Knowledge structure schemas contrast with 
“interactive frames” in that the latter refers to “a definition of what is going on, 
without which no utterance (or movement, or gesture) could be interpreted” 
(ibid, p. 206). This situationally grounded definition of interactive frames is 
apparently what Goffman intended when he used the term in his exposition of 
how our everyday experience is socially organized. It is thus safe to say that 
Goffman’s original insights about how such frames affect situated meaning have 
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yet to be fully integrated with any standard models of mental spaces and 
conceptual blending along the lines of Fauconnier and Turner (2002). Drawing 
on Bateson’s original idea of how there is a meta-message level of 
communication that signals to relevant participants certain ways in which the 
conveyed message should be interpreted, Goffman defines frames informally as 
the answer to the question “What is it that’s going on here?” and more formally 
as situational “principles of organization that govern events, at least social ones, 
and our subjective involvement in them” (Goffman, 1974, p. 10). 
My central contention here is that this Goffmanian notion of frame plays a 
significant role in making sense of particular conceptual integration networks 
that comprise constellations of blended and non-blended spaces. More 
specifically, such dynamic frames effectively signal what is “situationally 
relevant” at the moment of interaction, a suggestion that I believe will make a 
substantive contribution to the six-space model of conceptual blending put forth 
by Brandt (2004, 2005) and Brandt and Brandt (2005), which is a “nonstandard” 
alternative to Fauconnier and Turner’s framework. 
 
An Alternative View of Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration 
 
For any communicative event, Brandt and Brandt (2005) posit a semiotic 
Base space in which the very act of saying (or signification) takes place. A 
topical space that is set up from this base space is called a Reference space. 
When this happens, a parallel space will often accompany it, namely “a ‘site’ 
containing a way to imagine or otherwise access the reference, a way in which it 
is present or presented to the cognizer. This space is called a Presentation space 
of contents that our mind tires to map onto the referential content (Brandt, 2005, 
p. 1589). If a blend of the contents in the Presentation space and the Reference 
space obtains, then the Blended space (Blend 1 or Virtual space) will offer to 
the cognizing mind an instance of the referent as possessing the properties 
predicated of it (ibid, p. 1590). Brandt (2004, 2005) and Brandt and Brandt 
(2005) go on to suggest a third input space stemming from the Base, namely, a 
Relevance space which contains contextual semantic prerequisites and dynamic 
schemas projected onto the first blend to stabilize its meaning, yielding a final 
blended space where the situationally relevant meaning of the blend emerges 
(Blend 2 or Meaning space). This skeletal framework can perhaps be better 
grasped by applying it to a specific example. To use one of the examples given 
in Brandt (2005), let us imagine a situation in which you use a thermometer. 
Their claim is that there is some basic blending process going on in the 
culturally defined meaning of reading a notch on the scale of a thermometer, a 
process not unlike those in more complex blending phenomena, including 
metaphors. Since the thermometer is used to measure temperatures, the current 
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temperature of wherever you are will be set up in the Reference space as a 
topical element. Then suppose you look upon the graded scale of the 
thermometer, which will then be set up in the Presentation space. This scale on 
the device and your apartment’s thermic potential are then connected by a 
simple mapping to yield an imaginary blend. If the thermometer is believed to 
be a good, reliable probe in your culture (i.e., the use of the artifact is “relevant” 
to knowing the actual temperature of your room), then the blend is projected into 
another blended space that contains a situationally appropriate interpretation of 
the scale. This information, once deemed valid, is imported into the Base space. 
The corresponding network of mental spaces is presented in Fig. 1 below. It 
should be noted that this basic structure applies to other cases of conceptual 
blending, including metaphors.  
 
Fig. 1: Thermometer as a material anchor for conceptual blending (Brandt, 2005, p. 1591) 
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understanding of “what it is that is going on now” in the Relevance space (i.e., 
making an ethical evaluation), it is not clear how the metaphor can be 
interpreted evaluatively in this way. This indicates that such interactionally 
relevant information is indispensable for making sense of the blended meaning 
of the metaphor and for ultimately arriving at a situationally appropriate 
interpretation of the utterance. Notice here that what the Relevance space is 
hypothesized to be doing can be essentially equated with Fauconnier and 
Turner’s notion of selective projection, as is suggested by Hougaard (2005).  
One may ask at this point: Then, what relevance do all these semiotic 
procedures have to the proposed significance of Goffman’s insights for the 
MST-BT program? The answer is quite simple and can be presented in the form 
of a hypothesis: What organizes Brandt’s Relevance space is what Goffman 
attempted to capture with his notion of frame – an interactionally relevant frame 
in a given communicative event which is negotiated and co-constructed among 
participants while maintaining interactional order (i.e. “what is going on now”). 
In other words, Goffman’s notion of frame crucially regulates and sanctions the 
overall import (to be realized in Blend 2) of any “hyperliteral” blend in Blend 1 
in the six-space model of blending. The meaning of any conceptual blend, 
including metaphor, is thus very much susceptible to situational framing as any 
other acts of signification, a point often underemphasized in the standard version 
of MST and BT, if not actively ignored. 
 
Blending Case Study: We in the ESL Context 
 
In this section, I intend to elucidate how conceptual integration and 
disintegration can affect interlocutors’ understanding of the situation at hand by 
investigating the use of the first person plural pronoun we in specific interactions 
in an ESL classroom. 
 
Data 
 
All the data used in the following analysis come from a single source: 
interactions in an English as a Second Language class at Georgetown University, 
videotaped on Oct. 26, 1998. This “Advanced Communication Skills” class, 
consisting of seven students from diverse cultural backgrounds, was taught by a 
teacher who is a native speaker of English. The focus of the classroom activity 
was a listening comprehension exercise that used a short video clip on the 
development of medicine in the 20th century. In the following examples, “T” 
means the teacher and “S” a student. The parenthesized (m) and (f) denote 
“male” and “female”, respectively. 
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Who Are “We”? The Teacher’s Use of We as a Blend 
 
Any learner of English who has taken an ESL class in the United States 
will likely be able to attest to the frequent use of the first person plural we by 
their teachers, if they are asked to pay conscious attention to the distribution of 
we in their classroom interactions. This appears to be a natural tendency because, 
after all, teachers themselves are also engaged in classroom activities with their 
students most of the time. Furthermore, teachers’ signaling of “speaker 
inclusiveness” through their use of we in the classroom is often associated with 
their (conscious and unconscious) effort to help create a cooperative learning 
environment for more reciprocal exchanges with their students, rather than an 
authoritarian environment where one-way traffic of information is assumed from 
the teacher to students. In such cases, we quite simply represents the 
set-theoretic union of the teacher and the students in the classroom, at least in 
inclusive uses of the pronoun, where the speaker (the teacher) includes his/her 
addressee(s) in the referent(s) of we. No complications seem to arise. 
The transcription data used in this study, however, paint a different picture. 
There are some uses of we that suggest instances of conceptual blending, rather 
than simple unions in which the speaker and the addressee(s) are lumped 
together to form a group as a reference point from which the situation is viewed. 
The first example in (2) is an exchange that took place at an early point in 
the class, when the teacher is explaining to the students what they are going to 
listen to that day for their listening comprehension practice and how the content 
is different from the materials used before in listening comprehension exercises 
in the class The numbers on the lest correspond to the line numbers given in the 
full transcript in Appendix 1.  
 
(2)  
T:  A:nd instead of uh learning new microstrategies, new organizational strategies, (º)for 
note taking, we’re gonna try to apply the ones we’ve already learned (+) to these, to 
these documentaries. Okay so we’re still doing listening, we’re still doing 
note-taking, but it’s a slightly different format. Okay ‘nd the reason for that is (+) 
two-fold. First of all, not everything you listen to is lectures, ‘nd second of all, we’re, 
we have this new theme of the twentieth century, which Ms. (unintelligible)’s told 
you about, right?  
Ss: Yeah. Uhm. 
T: The twentieth century, your big final evaluATION task which starts in the mIddle of 
the semester.          Okay. 
S(m):         We’ve already started.  
T:  Yeah, I know ((nod)) SO, NOW starting in this class 
  Okay. SO uh um (+) before we watch the video,  
      it’s just a very short segment, sort of an introduction to this series of documentaries 
      Before we watch that, let me ask you (+) one question. 
      And that is: How has medicine changed in the last hundred years? (+++) 
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At first glance, all of the occurrences of we in the underlined part appear to be 
ordinary uses of the pronoun to represent both the teacher (speaker) and the 
students (addressees). Upon closer scrutiny, however, it becomes clear that such 
an understanding is likely to be missing an important point. Suppose all 
instances of we here refer to the set-theoretic union of the teacher and the 
students. If that is the case, the message conveyed by the underlined part should 
not undergo a dramatic change even if all occurrences of we are replaced by you 
and I, as in (3), if we disregard the stylistic awkwardness of using you and I 
repeatedly in a short segment of discourse. 
 
(3) You and I are gonna try to apply the ones you and I have already learned (+) to these, 
to these documentaries. Okay so you and I are still doing listening, you and I are 
still doing note-taking, but it’s a slightly different format. 
 
What emerges from this simple experiment is an apparent discrepancy between 
the teacher’s position as an “instructor” and the idea of the teacher (as “I”) 
engaging in particular learning processes designed by some verb phrases, 
particularly “have learned (the ones)” and “doing note taking”. In the actual 
classroom activities, the teacher does not take notes (at least not in the same as 
the students do), nor has she learned the microstrategies and other organizational 
strategies for note-taking that she mentioned, at least not synchronously with the 
students in the same classroom. If anything, she is rather in a position to impart 
her knowledge of such strategies to the students. I do not intend to rule out the 
possibility that teachers do learn new things about or gain new insights into the 
material they are teaching. On the contrary, it is probably the norm that they do. 
Even so, the type of learning that takes place in such cases is quite different 
from the type of learning that is usually achieved by students in classroom 
settings.   
It is my hypothesis that this kind of conceptual discrepancy in the use of 
we in the classroom triggers a conceptual blend in online construction of 
meaning in face-to-face interaction. This idea is fully compatible with Harder’s 
(2003) contention that there should be some potential contradiction between 
relevant pieces of information in order for partitioned mental representations (i.e. 
mental spaces) to obtain for conceptual blending. 
I further hypothesize that the process of conceptual blending that unfolds 
over (instantaneous) time in such uses of we also involves a simultaneous 
process of conceptual disintegration, in particular a “splitting” of the self 
(Hougaard, 2005). In sentences like Richard’s at war with himself over who to 
marry, incompatible aspects of a person are conceptualized as different people 
(Lakoff, 1996) and the self is thus split into two mental spaces, whose respective 
elements are in turn projected into a blended space to engender certain emergent 
meanings. “Different aspects of the same ‘person’ are manipulated individually 
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in the blend yielding emergent inferences that elaborate the conceptualization of 
‘Richard’ in the Dilemma space” (Hougaard, 2005, p. 1664). 
In the above ESL example in (2), then, what aspects of the speaker’s self 
can be conceived as incompatible? My answer resides in the basic asymmetry 
that holds in pedagogical relationships between those who teach and those who 
learn in instructional settings. In (2), the teacher is linguistically including 
herself in the group of people who have “learned” certain strategies, but learning 
and teaching do not usually take place within an individual simultaneously, 
although the notion of “self-teaching” is real to the extent that one’s knowledge 
status at one point may inform one’s overall knowledge at some different time. 
This notion of asymmetry is apparently weaker than the kinds of “contradiction” 
seen in Richard’s at war with himself over who to marry, but the teacher’s self is 
better understood as having two different aspects residing in different mental 
spaces (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Splitting process for the teacher’s self in (2) 
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because in this case, it is the teacher that is characterized in some way by 
elements in the “You” space, which will thus be the Presentation space. These 
two input spaces are structured by the teacher schema and the student schema, 
respectively, which are both stable knowledge structures stored in long-term 
memory, in the sense of Tannen and Wallat (1987). Then elements in the two 
input spaces are projected into the first blended space to yield some 
“hyperliteral” amalgam of concepts, namely, a group of individuals serving as 
both teacher and student, with their L2 ability conceptualized as if it were their 
L1 ability in some sense. At this stage, it is not clear how this blend can be 
interpreted in a situationally relevant way, until it is “significated” through the 
Relevant space, which I argue contains what Goffman (1974) called the 
“primary framework” of the situation at hand, i.e. the “dynamic interactional 
frame” in the sense of Tannen and Wallat (1987). My contention here is that the 
frame that is co-constructed by the interlocutors to be interactionally relevant to 
the situation is some kind of “collaborative learning”, where coordinated 
attempts are made to achieve learning in a secure environment, rather than some 
unidirectional flow of information in an authoritarian setting. This frame of 
collaborative learning then sanctions the emergent meaning of we as a group of 
collaborative learners in the second blended space, and that revised 
understanding of the situation is imported back to update the base space for 
further construction of mental space networks. Notice that this blended group of 
collaborative learners can be presumed to have their L2 (English) abilities 
scaffolded by the instructor’s fully competent ability as a native speaker of 
English because in this kind of collaborative environment, learners can be 
“pushed” to a higher level of proficiency without feeling threatened, a situation 
somewhat akin to Vygotsky’s notion of the zone of proximal development. A 
diagrammatic representation of the blending process is presented in Fig. 3 
below.  
Another likely instance of this blending process is seen in the following 
sequence in (4) as well. 
 
(4) 
T: “In vain”? (+) I don’t think we’ve studied this expression in All Clear yet. 
 If you search “in vain”, or you hunt “in vain”, you look for something “in vain”, it 
means (+) 
S(m): You go to the roots of it 
T: (++) No, the Opposite. 
S(m): opposite? 
T: You don’t get .. you search and you search but it’s all “in vain” because you didn’t 
find it (+) right? So if something’s in vain, that means “useless”. 
Ss: un-hun 
T: right? All this work done for nothing. 
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Here, the process designated by the verb study is something that the students 
engaged in at some point up to the present, but the teacher herself did not 
“study” the meaning of the phrase “in vain” in the same sense as the students; 
she acquired the meaning of the phrase through natural interactions with 
speakers of English, while that kind of “naturalistic” learning does not happen 
for the students to the same extent as the teacher’s own experience. This 
incongruity is thus a good candidate for triggering the kind of conceptual 
blending described above to reinforce the frame of collaborative learning in the 
updated base space, which is indeed the interactionally relevant frame 
negotiated and co-constructed by the participants to be interactionally relevant 
for the situation at hand.  
 
Fig. 3: Mental space representation of the online processes of blending 
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A gradience of We-ness   
It should be noted here that I am not arguing that any instance of we has 
the potential of triggering a conceptual blend. My contention is rather that there 
seems to be a “gradience of We-ness” along which specific instances of the first 
person plural pronoun can be arrayed, depending on the intensity of incongruity 
perceived between the standard You-and-Me schema (which conceives the 
referents of we as a simple sum of individuals) and whatever process designated 
in discourse to involve both “you” and “me”. When there is little to no 
incongruity, the interpretation of we has a low degree of We-ness, as defined by 
the extent to which all intended referents of we participate in the depicted 
process as a coherent group of equals for some intentional purpose, rather than 
as a simple set-theoretic union of individuals based primarily on their temporal 
and/or geographical copresence. For instance, in the exchange in (5), the use of 
we in the underlined part appears to clash, at least to some extent, with the 
following imperative, pay attention to the use of the “ether”, because such an 
imperative usually has the addressee(s) as the understood subject of the 
designated process. 
 
(5) 
T:  Why were they using ether? (+) “ETHER.”  Did anybody else hear it?  
Oh well, they were using ether, so they had to turn off the gaslight. 
S(m): Ether (unintelligible)... react as a combustion, I don’t know ... 
T:  Right. Ether is flammable. But why were they using ether in an 
operation? 
S(m):  Oh, for the lights, um for like (unintelligible) the candles? 
T:  No, the lights were gas ... 
S(m):                     I know, so for the, for the thing he was ... 
(unintelligible) 
S(f): the gaslight 
T:  Let’s listen to it again. When we listen to it again, pay attention to the 
use of the “ether.”  
 Okay, what other details did you hear? 
 
In cases like this, I hypothesize that the use of we is placed on an intermediate 
point along the cline of We-ness between the conception of we as a sum of 
individuals and the conception of we as a coherent group of equals with a strong 
motivation to achieve a certain goal. Therefore, there is no definitive answer to 
the question of whether the kind of conceptual blending proposed for the 
sequences in (2) and (4) would obtain. If the interactional frame established at 
the time of the exchange has a structure that prompts such blending, a blend may 
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indeed be carried out. On the other hand, in sequences like that in (6), the use of 
we in the underlined part is fully compatible with the You-and-Me schema and 
thus a blending process is unlikely to be initiated at all. 
 
(6) 
T:  Umm, today in the first hour of class we are going to do this listening 
activity which I’ll tell you about in a moment, and then in the second 
(+) hour of class we are going to um (+) talk about All Clear and do the 
dialogue if we can do that, and if not, at least going to the computer lab 
and look up some things about the IMF (+) because remember I told 
you that Wednesday we are going to the IMF (+) right?  We’ll talk 
about that more in the second hour just so you know what we are doing 
for today.  
  So (++) what I have here today is a documentary, A Science Odyssey – 
Matters of Life and Death. This is something completely different from 
what we have been doing before – not completely different but a little 
bit different, right? So think about everything that we’ve done in 
learning to listen, listening to learn, looking at the microstrategies, 
listening to those lectures, taking notes on those lectures. 
 
Thus, under my hypothesis, the kind of “We-ness” achieved through conceptual 
blending by using we to yield the conception of a motivated group of equals 
working toward a common goal is not categorical but is rather graded and 
continuous. If any of this is true, ESL teachers seem to have a lot to gain from 
using “blended we” to encourage students to participate in the learning as 
collaborative co-learners. In that sense, blended we can be an effective “positive 
face” strategy (Brown & Levinson, 1987) in the ESL classroom (or presumably 
any other classrooms). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Using an updated model of blending, this paper has examined how the use 
of we in certain instances can be reanalyzed as prompting a conceptual blend in 
which the referents of we are conceived of as a highly motivated group of 
equals working toward a shared goal. The underlying hypothesis there was that 
there is a cline of “We-ness” along which specific occurrences of we can be 
placed, ranging from the most individualistic reading of we to the most 
collaborative interpretation, which can be achieved by “situated” conceptual 
blending. Since the size of the data was rather small and there were only a 
handful of instances of we that were analyzed in naturally occurring discourse, 
however, the findings of this paper need to be validated through more extensive, 
A Blending Analysis of We in ESL Instruction  
empirically sound studies, including those employing large-scale corpora of 
interactional data. 
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